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SURETY BONDS ON FEDERAL CONSTRUCTION
CONTRACTS: CURRENT DECISIONS REVIEWED
EDWARD H. CUSHMAN*
I. INTRODUCTIONT HE essential principle upon which a mechanic's lien reAs is that of
unjust enrichment. Mechanics' liens have been created by statute
in every state of the Union because of the legislative realization of the
equity in favor of the mechanic resulting from an enhancement in value
due to the expenditure of work or the employment of materials upon
property without payment therefor. Since the security has been enhanced
in value, the creditors are not prejudiced by the existence of the lien."
Customarily, in a construction contract between private parties, labor-
ers and materialmen have a lien on the building to secure payment of
their claims; hence, if a contractor fails to pay laborers and materialmen,
the owner of a private building has the right to use any money owing
to the contractor to discharge his obligation to the laborers and material-
men. However, a building erected for the United States is not subject to
a mechanic's lien. The Government is under no legal liability to pay
laborers and materialmen but it is under an equitable obligation to do so'
A public body has a moral obligation to see that the persons who
furnished labor and material required in the construction of a public
project are paid in full.3 Prior to the passage of the Act of 1894, the
United States endeavored to fulfill this obligation and to protect unpaid
subcontractors, materialmen, and laborers by various methods.4 Con-
gress, by the Act of August 13, 1894,r commonly called the Heard Act,
Member of the Philadelphia and District of Columbia Bars.
1. In re Taylorcraft Aviation Corp., 168 F2d S03 (6th Cir. 1943).
2. National Surety Corp. v. United States, 132 Ct. Cl. 724, 133 F. Supp. 331, cert. denied,
350 U.S. 902 (1955). To discharge this equitable obligation, Congress pa.sd the Miller Act,
40 US.C.A. §§ 270(a)-(c), carrying forward prior acts and enlarging them, which required
the execution of a performance bond and a separate payment bond payable to the United
States as a condition precedent to the letting of a Government contract. Under such pay-
ment bond, the surety guarantees the payment of laborers and materialmen, and, upon per-
formance of this obligation, it relieves the United States from its equitable obligation to !:e
that the laborers and materialmen are paid.
3. Southwestern Portland Cement Co. v. Williams, 32 NI. 63, 251 Pac. 330 (1926);
Kansas City ex rel. Diamond Brick & Tile Co. v. Schroeder, 196 Mo. 231, 93 S.W. 405
(1906); St. Louis to Use of Glencoe Lime & Cement Co. v. Von Phul, 133 Mo. 561, 34
S.W. S43 (1S96); Knapp v. Swaney, 56 Mich. 345, 23 N.AV. 162 (1335).
4. See, e.g., Greenville Say. Bank v. Lawrence, 76 Fed. 545 (4th Cir.), affirming 71 Fed.
223 (D.S.C. 1896).
s. 28 Stat. 278.
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required any person entering into a formal contract with the United
States for the construction or repair of any public building or public
work to execute: "the usual penal bond, with good and sufficient sureties,
with the additional obligation that such contractor or contractors shall
promptly make payments to all persons supplying him or them labor and
materials in the prosecution of the work provided for in such con-
tract .... 
The Heard Act failed to protect the United States. A few subcon-
tractors instituted suit thereunder before the completion of the building,
and the payment of their claims tended to exhaust the penal sum of the
bond and thus prejudice the United States.0 Jurisdictional problems also
arose.7 Whereupon Congress, by an amendment of 19058, sought to rem-
edy these defects by assuring to the United States adequate opportunity
to enforce its demands against the contractor's surety, and the priority
of such demands. This purpose was accomplished by requiring other
creditors to refrain from suit on the bond for a period of six months after
completion of the contract and final settlement thereunder, and providing
that, if the United States had a claim on the bond, it should have priority
in distribution over all other claimants. 10
The Miller Act of August 24, 1935,11 eliminated procedural problems
raised by the Heard Act of 1894 as amended in 1905.12 The separation
6. United States v. American Surety Co., 135 Fed. 78 (1st Cir. 1905); United States
v. Heaton, 128 Fed. 414 (3d Cir. 1904); American Surety Co. v. Lawrenceville Cement Co.,
96 Fed. 25 (C.C.D. Me. 1899); McPhee v. United States to Use of Montrose Hardware
Co., 64 Colo. 421, 174 Pac. 808 (1918).
7. Davidson Bros. Marble Co. v. United States ex rel. Gibson, 213 U.S. 10 (1909);
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. United States for the Benefit of Kenyon, 204
U.S. 349 (1907), overruling United States ex rel. Maxwell v. Barrett, 135 Fed. 189 (C.C.
N.D. Cal. 1905); United States to Use of Benjamin F. Shaw Co. v. Schofield Co., 239 Pa.
582, 87 At. 14 (1913).
8. 33 Stat. 811. The Act was further amended by substituting for the words "Circuit
Court" as set forth in the Act, the words "District Court." 36 Stat. 1167 (1911).
9. Illinois Surety Co. v. United States to the Use of Peeler, 240 U.S. 214 (1916). In
1905, the Treasury Department was not only in charge of a considerable portion of the
federal building projects, but was in charge of the auditing of accounts thereof. The official
in charge of construction would certify that the building was completed, a letter would
be prepared setting forth the contract price, the additions and deductions, if any, and pay-
ments on account, and recommending that a final voucher for the sum therein specified be
drawn to the order of the contractor. The date of the administrative approval of this
"final settlement letter" by the Treasury Department was held to be the date of final
settlement within the meaning of Heard Act. See also note 50 infra.
10. While this amendment of 1905 was somewhat ambiguous, the courts construed It so
as to give full effect to its obvious purpose and avoid injustice or absurd results. London
and Lancashire Indemnity Co. v. Smoot, 287 Fed. 952 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
11. 40 U.S.C.A. §§ 270(a)-(c).
12. MacEvoy v. United States for the Use and Benefit of the Calvin Tompkins Co., 322
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of the dual obligation of performance and payment of labor and material
claims into separate instruments executed simultaneously followed the
Pennsylvania practice.13
The Miller Act provides that before any contract exceeding $2,000
in amount for the construction, alteration or repair of any public build-
ing or public work of the United States is awarded to any person, such
contractor shall furnish to the United States: (1) a performance surety
bond in such amount as the officer awarding the contract shall deem ade-
quate for the protection of the United States, and (2) a separate pay-
ment surety bond for the protection of certain suppliers of labor and
material in a penal sum equal to one-half of the contract price, when the
total amount payable by the terms of the contract is not more than one
million dollars, and such a bond in a smaller fraction of the contract price
where the total amount payable, by the terms of the contract, is more
than one million dollars.
II. DEFINITIONS
Public Work
The term "public work" is required to be understood in its plain,
obvious and rational sense, and includes any work in which the United
States is interested, and which was done for the public, and for which the
United States was authorized to expend funds.14
It includes a vessel constructed under contract for the United States,'2
the work of raising a sunken towboat from a canal,' and work on a rail-
road roadbed and tunnel on a flood control project. 17 Public works gen-
erally are fixed or movable property the title to which is vested in the
United States.' s
Labor and Materki
The term "labor and material" has been liberally construed. For illus-
tration, the bond has been held to cover groceries and provisions required
U.S. 102 (1944), reversing 137 F.2d 565 (3d Cir.), which had reversed 49 F. Supp. 81
(D.N.J. 1943).
13. The problems sought to be corrected in Pennsyl ania, and a review of the Pennsyl-
vania legislation will be found in two articles by the writer, New Pennsylvana Bond Lavs,
36 Dick. L. Rev. 69 (1932), and Recent Decisions and Trends in Building Construction Lav,
9 Temp. L.Q. 125 (1935).
14. United States to the Use of Noland Co. v. Irvin, 316 U.S. 23 (1942); Peter-on v.
United States for Use of Marsh Lumber Co., 119 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1941).
15. Title Guaranty & Trust Co. v. Crane Co., 219 U.S. 24 (1910).
16. United States for Use and Benefit of Shlager v. MacNeil Bros. Co., 27 F. Supp. 1S
(D. Mass. 1939).
17. Peterson v. United States for Use of Marsh Lumber Co., 119 F2d 145 (6th Cir.
1941).
18. 35 Comp. Gen. 454 (1956).
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for a construction camp distant from a built up area,'0 and freight."
Recovery has been allowed for the fair rental value of equipment while
in use on a construction project and necessary parts and appliances
wholly consumed in the performance of the work,2 but not for such ren-
tal while the equipment is idle.22 There is now pending in the Sixth
Circuit a question growing out of the following facts: The Federal Gov-
ernment had undertaken simultaneously the construction of two buildings
on an engineering job under two separate contracts. A subcontractor
having subcontracts for earth moving work on both contracts, leased
earth moving equipment on one project, then moved the equipment to
the second project, and after discontinuing such use on the second project
permitted the equipment to stand idle at or near that job site. A num-
ber of days later he removed the equipment to the first project for the
resumption of work there. The District Court held the prime contractor
for the second project obligated under the Miller Act to the lessor of
such equipment for the rental value thereof for the period the equipment
was standing idle at or near the second project and not actually used
thereat.23
Recovery has been allowed where the transaction was found to be a
rental and not a sales agreement.24
Several courts, under exceptional circumstances, have recently allowed
recovery for materials which were not actually used in the performance
of a contract. In Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. United States for Use
of Crane Co.," pipe procured under priority or allocation order re-
stored to inventory to replace identical material fabricated to meet the
specifications of the contract and incorporated into the work was held to
be within a liberal construction of the Miller Act. On the authority of
this case recovery was allowed for stock-piled material, although much
of the shipped material was not physically used on the job in question
but went to replace electrical equipment stock actually used on the job.2 1
Recovery was denied for materials which went into a stock-pile, which
included similar items purchased from other suppliers, where there was
19. Brogan v. National Surety Co., 246 U.S. 257 (1918).
20. Standard Acc. and Ins. Co. v. United States for the Use and Benefit of Powell,
302 U.S. 442 (1938).
21. Continental Cas. Co. v. Clarence L. Boyd Co., 140 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1915).
22. United States for Use of Edward E. Morgan Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 147 F.2d
423 (5th Cir. 1945).
23. United States for the Use of Codell Constr. Co. v. Hartman, Inc., - F. Supp. -
(N.D. Ohio 1956), appeal docketed, No. 1285, 6th Cir. (1956).
24. Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Browning-Ferris Mach. Co., 227 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1955).
25. 213 F.2d 106 (10th Cir. 1954).
26. United States for the Use of Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Fourt, 131 F. Supp.
584 (W.). Okla. 1955), judgment aff'd, - F.2d - (10th Cir. 1956).
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no evidence of any record to show which material had actually been used
in the performance of the public work and which had been used for work
on other contracts2 7
It is not essential to a recovery by a materialman on a payment bond
required under the Miller Act that the material furnished to a sub-
contractor, being delivered at the site of the work, be thereafter actually
incorporated into the project. However, the materialman must prove
not only that he furnished the material but also that the material fur-
nished was in accordance with his contract with the subcontractor, which
called for material conforming with the specifications of the principal
contract.
2 8
Labor and material does not include premium on Workmen's Com-
pensation Insurance 9 or Workmen's Compensation awarded for in-
juries30 In recent years a number of our courts have also held that there
is no liability under a payment bond taken pursuant to the Miller Act
for federal taxes owed by a contractor or subcontractor.31
While the Government has now accepted the conclusion of the various
appellate courts that the liability of an employer to pay over to the
Government amounts deducted and withheld from employees' wages is
a tax liability rather than a wage liability, it has by no means abandoned
27. United States for the Benefit and Use of Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Rob-
bins, 125 F. Supp. 25 (D. Mlass. 1954).
23. United States ex rel. Purity Paint Products Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co,
56 F. Supp. 431 (D. Conn. 1944). Here recovery was allowed for paint vhich was found
to have the chemical content conforming to the specifications. The manufacturer's affi-
davits as to quality, as required by the specifications, were accepted and approved. The
containers were labelled as required.
Where paint which has been made especially for use in the construction of an air base
warehouse met all specifications required by the contract and had the Area Englneer's ap-
proval, the general contractor who had refused to accept the paint after authorizing ship-
ment thereof was held liable to the paint manufacturer for the difference betwen the
contract price and the present market value of the paint. Judgment was entered against
the contractor and his surety on the Miller Act bond. United States for the Use and Bene-
fit of Morris Paint & Varnish Co. v. Watson, 129 F. Supp. 573 (D. Neb. 1955).
29. United States to Use and Benefit of New York Cas. Co. v. Standard Surety & Cas.
Co., 32 F. Supp. 836 (S.I.N.Y. 1940).
30. United States v. Harmond, 192 F.2d 999 (4th Cir. 1951).
31. United States v. Crosland Constr. Co., 217 F.2d 275 (4th Cir.), affirming 120 F.
Supp. 792 (E.D.S.C. 1954); Firemen's Fund Indemnity Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 472
(9th Cir. 1954), reversing 100 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Cal. 1951); United States v. Zschach
Constr. Co, 209 F.2d 347 (10th Cir. 1954), affirming 110 F. Supp. 551 (E.D. Ola. 1953);
General Cas. Co. v. United States, 205 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1953); United States Fi-
delity & Guaranty Co. v. United States, 201 F.2d 118 (loth Cir. 1952); Westover v.
Wrilliarn Simpson Constr. Co., 209 F.2d 90S (9th Cir. 1954), affirming 1C0 F. Supp. 125
(S.D. Cal. 1951). These decisions find support in Central Bank v. United State:, 345 Us.
639 (1953), reversing 123 Ct. Cl. 237, 105 F. Supp. 992 (1952).
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the fight. The Government was successful in United States v. Phoenix
Indemnity Co.,32 under the following circumstances:
The Housing Authority of the City of Fayettesville, North Carolina,
entered into a contract for the construction of a low cost housing project.
This construction contract provided that the contractor should " ... pro-
vide and pay for all materials, labor... taxes legally collectible because of
the work and all other services and facilities of every nature whatsoever
npcessary to execute the work under the contract." A single surety bond
was given which combined the obligations and performance and payment
of labor and material claims. Approximately one year after commencing
work the contractor acknowledged it was in default and the surety agreed
to undertake completion of the project. During the period when the con-
tractor was engaged in performance it employed diverse individuals on
the work and as a result thereof the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
made certain assessments upon the contractor as employer, representing
taxes, penalties and interest due for Federal Unemployment taxes and
for the employer's portions of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act
taxes. In addition to these taxes the Commissioner assessed a substantial
sum against the employer for withholding taxes and for the employee's
portion of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act taxes for the same
period. The lower court held the surety was not liable for the taxes com-
posing these latter assessments. The Fourth Circuit held that the surety
was liable under the bond for all the taxes mentioned and the judgment
of the District Court was accordingly modified. It held its conclusion
not to be at variance with its decision in United States v. Crosland
Constr. Co.3" and the line of cases therein discussed. It stated that in
each of those cases suit had been brought on a surety bond given by the
contractor to insure the performance of the contract work and the con-
dition of the bond related to the obligation of the contractor to make
payment to persons supplying labor and material to the work and did
not refer to an obligation of the contractor to pay taxes due the Gov-
ernment. The bond and contract in the Phoenix Indemnity Co. case con-
strued together were distinguished, 'the court stating that the bond in
this suit covered not only the obligation of the employer to pay the wages
earned by his employees, but also to pay the taxes collectible because of
the work, and that there could be no doubt that the sums of money sued
for were either taxes payable directly by the employer to the United
States, or moneys withheld by him from the wages of his employees un-
der the federal tax statutes which had become taxes due the Government
in his hands. The bond here guaranteed the performance of all covenants
32. 231 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1956).
33. 217 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1954).
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and agreements undertaken by the contractor in the contract. These
covenants and agreements included the agreement to pay all the taxes
collectible because of the work, a provision held to be broad enough to
cover not only the taxes payable by the employer, such as unemploy-
ment taxes and the employer's portion of the Federal Insurance Con-
tributions Act taxes, but also the withholding taxes which were credited
on the income taxes due by the employees and the employees' portion
of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act taxes. While the United
States was not a party to this Housing Authority contract or the bond,
it was held that the bond was made for the Government's protection and
that it was entitled to sue thereon as a third party beneficiary34
If the Supreme Court of the United States continues to adhere to its
recent terse rulings and Congress does not change the law, it would ap-
pear that under Title 26 of the United States Code, section 3670, a lien
that is specific and choate under state law, no matter how diligently en-
forced, can never prevail against a subsequent federal tax lien short of
reducing the lien to final judgment. A dissenting opinion states that
this is a new doctrine not warranted by the decisions of the Court.?5
A claim for contribution due from a bankrupt employer to a union wel-
fare fund is not a wage claim entitled to priority in bankruptcy proceed-
ings. 6 The Ninth Circuit has held that a suit may not be prosecuted
under the Miller Act against the surety for sums required to be paid by
the contractor into a health and welfare fund under a collective bargain-
ing agreement entered into by the contractor with an employees' organi-
zation.
Subcontractor
The Miller Act makes no attempt to define the word subcontractor.
The Supreme Court, in substance, has defined a subcontractor under
34. In American Fidelity Co. v. Delaney, 114 F. Supp. 702 (D. VL 1953), it was held
that a highway contractor's Performance bond and Wages and Material bond, pozted pur-
suant to a state public works contract, did not render the surety liable to the Government
for withholding taxes and Social Security taxes withheld by the principal from the em-
ployees' wages, but not paid to the United States, where the United States failed to comply
with the state statutory requirements to establish a claim against the principal under
such statutory Wages and Material bond.
35. United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956), reversing 227 F2d
359 (7th Cir. 1955). See also United States v. Colotta, 350 U.S. S0S (1955), reversing 79 So.
2d 474 (Aiss. 1955).
36. In re Sleep Products, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 463 (S.DMN.Y. 1956); In re BraoZl, 135 F.
Supp. 827 (N.D.N.Y. 1955).
37. United States for the Benefit and on Behalf of Sherman v. Carter, 229 F.2d 645 (9th
Cir.), cert. granted, 351 U.S. 917 (1956), distinguishing an action upon a bond required by
a state statute from a case involving a Miller Act bond. See Sherman v. Achterman, Civl
No. 2369, Cal. App. Dep't, Mlay 18, 1955, in which the surety was held liable.
1956]
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the Miller Act as one who performs for and takes from the prime con-
tractor a specific part of the labor or materials required in the original
contract, thus excluding ordinary laborers and materialmen.,3  MacEvoy
v. United States39 decided that one who sells building materials to an-
other for resale to the contractor for use on a Government project was
not entitled to recover under a payment bond furnished by a contractor
pursuant to the Miller Act. The Supreme Court reasoned that Con-
gress cannot be presumed, in the absence of express statutory language,
to have intended to impose liability on the payment bond in situations
where it is difficult or impossible for the prime contractor to protect
himself. It is easy for a prime contractor to secure himself against loss
by requiring the subcontractors to give security by bond or otherwise
for the payment of those who contract directly with the subcontractor.
However, this method of protection was deemed generally inadequate
to cope with remote and undeterminable liabilities incurred by an ordi-
nary materialman who may be a manufacturer, a wholesaler or a retailer.
To impose unlimited liability under the payment bond in favor of sub-
materialmen and laborers, it was held, would create a precarious and
perilous risk on the prime contractor and his surety.
In a recent case the contractor entered into an agreement with a
supplier to furnish and deliver to the job site all millwork as required
by the contract documents. Among the items specifically mentioned were
certain doors which this supplier ordered from the plaintiff. These doors
were manufactured in accordance with the specifications referred to in
the principal contract and were delivered to the principal contractor. A
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the supplier was not
a subcontractor within the meaning of the Miller Act, but merely a ma-
terialman, was dismissed, the District Court holding that by contracting
with the general contractor to supply specific items to be manufactured
in accordance with the specifications of the prime contract, and in so
doing taking over a part of the prime contract itself by specific refer-
ence thereto, the supplier became a subcontractor in the technical sense.41
38. MacEvoy v. United States for the Use and Benefit of Calvin Tompkins Co., 322
U.S. 102 (1944), reversing 137 F.2d 565 (3d Cir.), which had reversed 49 F. Supp. 81
(DN.J. 1943); Southern Painting Co. v. United States for the Use of E. M. Silver, 222
F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1955), distinguishing United States for Use and Benefit of Dorfmann v.
Standard Surety & Cas. Co., 37 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Houston Fire & Cas.
Ins. Co. v. United States by and for the Use of First State Bank of Denton, 217 F.2d
734 (5th Cir. 1954).
39. 322 U.S. 102 (1944), reversing 137 F.2d 565 (3d Cir.), which had reversed 49 F.
Supp. 81 (D.N.J. 1943).
40. United States to the Use of Hardwood Products Corp. v. John A. Johnson & Sons,




A person having a direct contractual relationship with a subcon-
tractor, but no contractual relationship, express or implied, with the
principal contractor, must give written notice to the contractor within
ninety days after the date on which such claimant performed the last of
the labor or supplied the last of the material for which the claim is
made.41 This provision is intended to give immunity to the contractor
from undisclosed claims of materialmen where the contractor withholds
payment to the subcontractor for ninety days.4 2 If no notice is given
by the claimant under a subcontractor within the ninety day period, the
materialman has no right of action on the bond.3
A written notice received by the contractor within the statutory period
is sufficient, although not sent by registered mail. ' The Fifth Circuit has
held that the statute is sufficiently complied with if the proof shows con-
vincingly that knowledge has been brought home to the principal con-
tractor. It is not necessary that the writing relied on be signed by the
supplier. It is sufficient that there exists a writing from which, in con-
nection with oral testimony, it plainly appears that the nature and state
of the indebtedness was brought home to the general contractor. When
this appears, the object of the statute, to assure that the contractor will
have notice, is attained and the statute is complied with 5
A materialman wrote a letter to the contractor regarding an unpaid
bill of a subcontractor. The contractor answered suggesting that the ma-
terialman communicate with the bonding company and advise the con-
tractor in about ninety days of the result of his appeal to the bonding
company. It was held that by not protesting the first notice, there was
either a conditional waiver or modification of the notice obligation, and
the materialman was allowed to recover4 Furthermore, where the con-
tractor guarantees payment of the materialman's claim, this relieves the
41. 40 U.S.C.A. § 270(b).
42. United States for Use of Bruce Co. v. Fraser Constr. Co., 37 F. Supp. I (W.D. Ar.
1949).
43. United States for the Use and Benefit of John A. Dac's Sons Co. v. Ba, I1 F.2d
965 (6th Cir. 1940); United States to Use of Kewaunee Alfg. Co. v. United States Guaranty
Co, 37 F. Supp. 561 (W.D.N.Y. 1939).
44. Fleisher Engineering & Constr. Co. v. United States for the Use and Benefit of
Haflenbeck, 311 US. 15 (1940).
45. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. United States for the Use and Benefit of Trane
Co, 217 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 1954), affirming 123 F. Supp. 831 (NM.D. Tex. 1954), folloing
Coffee v. United States for Use and Benefit of Gordon, 157 F2d 963 (Sth Cir. 1946).
46. United States for the Use and Benefit of Franidin Paint Co. v. Kagan, 129 F. Supp.
331 (D. Mass. 1955).
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materialman of the obligation of notice under the Miller Act.4 7 The re-
quirement of notice may be waived.48
IV. TImE FOR SUIT
Each claimant institutes a separate action in the District Court for
any district in which the contract was to be performed, and not else-
where, at any time after the expiration of ninety days after the date on
which the last labor was performed or the last material was furnished or
supplied by him, for which such claim is made. Such action must be
commenced within one year after the date of final settlement of the
principal contract with the United States.49 Final settlement has been
defined as the administrative determination by the Government of the
sum found to be due the contractor. It may antedate final payment."0
The Comptroller General's certificate of the date of final settlement is
conclusive and may not be questioned by either the contractor or his
surety in the absence of fraud or mistake."1
Where a subcontractor fully complied with the terms of the contract
and was in no way responsible for the delay in final payment by the
Government, as where such delay occurred because the principal con-
tractor became insolvent, resulting in the taking over and the completion
of the job by the surety, a provision in the subcontract that final payment
thereunder should not be due until the principal contractor received final
payment from the Government must be construed in the light of the
Miller Act, giving the subcontractor a right to sue on the payment bond.
Hence, a subcontractor's suit, instituted more than ninety days after
the final settlement but prior to the expiration of one year from final
47. United States for Use of W. E. Foley & Bro., Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar-
anty Co., 113 F.2d 888 (2d -Cir. 1940).
48. United States and for Use and Benefit of Korosh v. Otis Williams & Co., 30 F.
Supp. 590 (E.D. Idaho 1939).
49. 40 U.S.C.A. § 270(b).
50. Globe Indemnity Co. v. United States to the Use of Steacy-Schmidt Mfg. Co., 291
U.S. 476 (1934), reversing 66 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1933). See note 9 supra.
51. United States for Use and Benefit of Tobin Quarries, Inc. v. Glasscock, 27 F. Supp.
534 (ED. Mo. 1939). The certificate of the Comptroller General as to the date of final
settlement must be supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether the deci-
sion of the Comptroller General is supported by substantial evidence, the record as a whole,
and not merely the evidence on which the official based his decision, was reviewed in
United States ex rel. Bangor Roofing and Sheet Metal Co. v. Cunningham, 141 F. Supp.
205 (D. Me. 1956). The court held that the date of final settlement, as certified, was not
supported by substantial evidence and directed that judgment be entered in favor of the
claimant on the contractor's surety bond. This case also holds that the burden is upon the
claimant to establish that it has satisfied the condition imposed by the Miller Act of bring-
ing suit within a year after the date of final settlement, but that no more than a pre-
ponderance of the evidence is required to sustain this burden.
[Vol. 25
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settlement, was held not to be premature, notwithstanding the fact that
the contractor had not been paid by the United States Government. -
Since the Miller Act vests exclusive jurisdiction in the District Court for
the district where the contract is to be performed, and not elsewhere, a
suit in the state court will be dismissed. 3
V. AMOUNT RECOVERABLE BY SUBCONTRACTORS
The amount recoverable by subcontractors under the Miller Act bond
is ordinarily the unpaid portion of the contract price 4 The interpreta-
tion of the original plans and specifications of the prime contract, as made
by the Government Engineer, was held binding on the subcontractor so
that the subcontractor could not, in a Miller Act suit, collect for work
which the subcontractor considered to be extras but which the Govern-
ment Engineer considered as being included in the original plans and
specifications. 5
Where a subcontractor, because of unanticipated soil conditions, has
done work other than soil moving and compacting contemplated by the
subcontract, he may recover in quantum meruit for work done, notwith-
standing that the change order agreed to by the United States and the
contractor provided that the subcontractor should do such work without
further compensation.s
Where a prime contractor for rehabilitation work on Government
camps materially breached a subcontract for plumbing and heating work,
the subcontractor was entitled to recover under the Miller Act bond on
52. United States for the Use of Ackerman v. Holloway Co, 126 F. Supp. 347 (D.N.M.
1954); United States for Use of Bailey v. United Pacific Ins. Co, 122 F. Supp. 43 (D.N.M.
1954).
53. Pierce Contractors, Inc. v. Peerless Cas. Co., 81 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 1955). A sub-
contractor under a federal project may sue the general contractor directly on the sub-
contract wherever he can get proper service. Such a suit is not an action on the Miller
Act bond and is not required to be brought in the Federal District Court in an area in
which the work was done, and can be maintained in a state court. Voelz v. Milgram Con-
tracting Co., 75 N.W.2d 305 (Wis. 1956), citing Western Cas. and Surety Co. v. Bi --, 217
F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1954). On July 28, 1956 the Fifth Circuit held that in view of the
difference in the action authorized under the Miller Act from that contemplated under the
Heard Act, the provision in the Miller Act limiting the place of suit is a rectriction only
on venue rather than on the power of a federal court to entertain the suit and a statutory
provision which could be waived by the failure of a defendant to move by timely motion
to attach the venue. Texas Constr. Co. v. United States for Use of Caldwell Foundry and
Machinery Co., - F.2d - (5th Cir. 1956).
54. Lee E. Morris, Inc. v. United States for the Use and Benefit of Roberts, 219 F.2d
541 (loth Cir. 1955).
55. United States for the Benefit and on Behalf of Lanehart v. United Enterprses Inc,
226 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1955).
56. United States for the Use of T. M. Page Corp. v. Hensler, 125 F. Supp. 837 (S.D.
Cal. 1954). See also Continental Cas. Co. v. Schaefer, 173 F2d S (9th Cir. 1949).
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a quantum meruit basis. Recovery was also allowed following an oral
rescission of a contract. 8
In one case two government contractors engaged a single subcontrac-
tor, who in turn purchased materials from the plaintiff. It was held that
the plaintiff could apply to either prime contractor an amount paid by
the subcontractor, without direction, from his personal funds, and the
first prime contractor was not entitled to have this payment apply to dis-
charge its liability in the proportion in which the plaintiff had previously
allocated payments between the prime contracts. 9
If a subcontractor who receives from the contractor a check together
with an accompanying letter of transmittal containing a breakdown of
the total amount, including a specified sum for work done pursuant to
change orders, protests by telephone to the contractor, but nevertheless
deposits the check, there is an accord and satisfaction and the subcon-
tractor may not maintain a civil action on the contractor's Miller Act
bond. However, the mere retention of the check tendered as payment
for all obligations in connection with the contract does not evidence a
clear indication that the payment was accepted as satisfaction for extra
work not required by the contract.60
VI. WAIVER OF BOND RIGHTS
Waivers of rights of subcontractors under statutory public work bonds
are not favored by the law, and will not be implied or enforced without a
showing of a clear intent to relinquish such rights.01 However, if it ap-
pears that the subcontract was awarded to the subcontractor on the reli-
ance of the materialman's representation that if the general contractor
would award the subcontract to this subcontractor and waive a perform-
ance bond from him, the materialman would furnish all materials to the
subcontractor and save the general contractor harmless from claims for
57. Southern Painting Co. v. United States for the Use of Silver, 222 F.2d 431 (10th
Cir. 1955). See also United States for Use of Susi Contracting Co. v. Zara Contracting Co.,
146 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1944); Great Lakes Constr. Co. v. Republic Creosoting Co., 139 F.2d
456 (8th Cir. 1943); United States for Use of Wander v. Brotherton, 106 F. Supp. 353
(S.D.N.Y. 1952).
58. United States for the Use and Benefit of Irvine v. Traylor Bros., Inc., 133 F. Supp.
104 (N.D. Ind. 1955).
59. United States to the Use of General Electric Distributing Corp. v. Bell Constr. Co.,
226 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1955).
60. United States for the Use of Glickfeld v. Krendel, 136 F. Supp. 276 (D.N.J. 1955).
This case also holds that a claimant may maintain a suit on the bond for extras ordered
verbally notwithstanding a state statute, which in effect, provides that a written contract,
containing a provision that it cannot be changed orally, may not be lawfully changed by
an executory agreement unless such agreement is in writing, and signed by the party against
whom enforcement of the change is sought.
61. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Smithwick, 222 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1955).
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material, there appears a contractual relationship between the material-
man and the general contractor whereby the materialman waived his
rights under the Miller Act bond."
Where a Government contractor did not furnish a payment bond be-
cause the provisions of the Miller Act were waived pursuant to an execu-
tive order issued by the President, as authorized by the First War Pow-
ers Act, a supplier who furnished labor and material to a subcontractor
was not entitled to recover payment from the Government contractor.C'
Bonds are again required on construction contracts. It is submitted that
such a waiver is not in the public interest.
VII. ADVANTAGES OF BoND PROTECTION
Much can be written in detail of the advantages of requiring, in com-
petitive bidding, a performance and a labor and materialman's bond.
Tersely stated, the advantages may be tabulated as follows:
A. Advantages to owner and architect.
1. In effect a prequalification service, through the medium of the
surety industry's nationwide experience, organization, and sound under-
writing.
2. The availability to the Government of the surety industry's
extensive records relating to contractors and the key officials behind the
corporate contract name.
3. Organization of joint ventures in order to increase the number
of responsible bidders.
4. The refusal to bond certain applicants enables the award of
the contract to be made to the lowest responsible bidder deemed qualified
for the contract by a surety willing to assume the risk of loss.
B. The performance bond assures:
1. Lowest available market price.
2. Elimination of pressure upon officials who make the award.
3. Fair and equitable treatment of all bidders, under the demo-
cratic principles of free enterprise, which inspires public confidence by
the elimination of fraud and favoritism, and creates the desired large pool
of qualified contractors in bidding.
4. The elimination of delay, as examination of the low bidder's
qualifications has been made by the surety prior to the letting date.
5. A confirmation and check of the contracting officer with re-
62. United States for the Use and Benefit of Continental Lumber Co. v. Embrey, 130
F. Supp. 643 (D. Idaho 1955).
63. Gallaher & Speck, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 226 F.2d 728 (7th Cir. 19SS).
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spect to the qualifications of the low bidder, thus relieving him of criti-
cism in default situations when they occur.
6. The assumption of the Government's risk of loss within the
limits of the penal sum of the performance bond.
C. When trouble develops:
1. The loss preventive activities of the surety often avert de-
faults in performance, thus expediting completion. Sureties can, and do,
render technical assistance, financial aid, and eliminate disputes between
contractor and subcontractor.
2. The bond assures against loss through diversion or mis-
application of funds by the contractor or his employees; through the use
of defective materials and workmanship; through improper installa-
tion resulting from inexperience or other failure to adhere to plans and
specifications; and through the death or disability of experienced per-
sonnel.
3. The shifting of the risk to the surety assures completion of
the contract or defrayment of the Government's costs within the bond
penalty, thus permitting a definite fixation of the Government's cost at
the contract price.
4. The bond also assures compliance with the plans and specifica-
tions, thus affording protection against defective workmanship or ma-
terials.
D. Advantages to suppliers of labor and material; the payment bond
assures:
1. Prompt payment to subcontractors and to furnishers of labor
and materials.
2. Elimination of loading charge for credit hazard resulting in
lower over-all cost.
3. Greater competition among subcontractors and furnishers of
materials which brings further reduction in over-all cost.
4. Acceleration of the progress and completion of the contract,
because the bond enhances a flow of materials to the extent that material-
men can act more promptly by reason of the reduced credit risk.
5. Preferment of deliveries to bonded contractors by suppliers
when labor and materials may be in short supply.
VIII. WHERE THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFAULTS
Where the surety has determined that there is a reasonable basis for
the Government terminating the agreement of the contractor the surety
has bonded by reason of this contractor's default, the surety usually has
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two alternatives, i.e., to undertake completion, or to waive its right to
completion.
Among the factors which the surety will consider are the following:
(a) Whether it can use the defaulted contractor's organization or
whether it will have to find a new contractor.
(b) The rights, if any, of the bank to whom the contractor may have
assigned current estimates.
(c) Whether the subcontractors are responsible and qualified.
(d) The sums which it must immediately pay subcontractors and
materialmen to induce them to complete.
(e) Whether there is a risk of a loss greater than the amount of the
performance bond.
Where, as sometimes is the case, there is a one-sided provision in the
contract of a type which the Court of Claims has rightly condemned,C
such as have existed in recent cases,a the surety cannot be blamed for
being unwilling to assume a hazardous uncertain obligation.
The surety's burden has been made serious by decisions to the effect
that the United States has the right to withhold from the surety sums
payable by the contractor for taxes, and that this right exists whether
it be a completing surety or its obligations arose out of payments for
labor and material due by the defaulting contractor, or whether these
taxes grew out of the bonded job or arose from tax obligations of the
contractor having no relationship to the bonded job." The General Ac-
counting Office has ruled that the effect of the decision holding that the
Government can set off the contractor's unpaid taxes as against a com-
pleting surety, can be avoided if before assuming the completion, the
surety enters into an agreement with the Government by the terms of
which the Government agrees to pay it, as completing surety, such a
portion of the unpaid contract price as equals the surety's completion
64. Ozark Dam Constructors v. United States, 130 CL Cl. 354, 3S9, 127 F. Supp. IS7, 1
(1955). Nith true insight of the basic problem, Judge Madden wrote:
"A contract for immunity from the harmful consequences of one's o%-.n negligence always
presents a serious question of public policy. That question seems to us to be particularly
serious when, as in this case, if the Government got such an immunity, it bougbt it by
requiring bidders on a public contract to increase their bids to cover the contingency of
damages caused to them by the negligence of the Government's agents. Why the Govern-
ment would want to buy and pay for such an immunity is hard to imagine. If it does, by
such a provision in the contract, get the coveted privilege, it vl win an occasional battle,
but lose the war."
65. United States v. Moormon, 338 U.S. 457 (1950), reversing 113 Ct. Cl. 159, 82 F.
Supp. 1010 (1949). See also United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 93 (1951), reversing 117
Ct. C1. 92 (1950). The effect of the Supreme Court's decision here as corrected by Public
Law 356, 41 U.S.C.A. §§ 321-22.
66. United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234 (1947); Standard Accident Ins.
Co. v. United States, 119 Ct. CL. 749, 97 F. Supp. 829 (1951). See also note 35 supra.
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costs. The Comptroller General has held that the surety's agreement
to complete the contract, regardless of cost, is an additional obligation
sufficient to constitute legal consideration to the Government for the
Government's promise to make the payment to the surety, since prior to
the agreement the surety was not obligated to complete the contract."
A few months after this opinion, the Comptroller General held that a
surety was not entitled to moneys earned by a contractor prior to a de-
fault, including retained percentages, if the surety merely limited its
assumption of completion by the bond penalty. The Comptroller Gen-
eral held that there was no consideration running to the Government
sufficient to afford a legal basis for awarding this fund to the completing
surety60
The contractor who enters into an agreement with the surety to com-
plete the work of another contractor who defaulted should scrutinize his
agreement to ascertain whether it is an agreement to complete a certain
portion of the work or is an absolute agreement for the prosecution to
completion of the previous construction contract.0 9 Of course, if the
surety declines to complete its obligation it is liable for the cost of work
substantially similar to that which the defaulting contractor obligated
himself to perform."0
The Assignment of Claims Act as amended,71 was enacted to enable
a contractor to obtain money to finance his contract with the United
States. The Court of Claims held the equity of the surety to be superior
to the rights acquired by the bank under a valid legal assignment.2
A surety who has paid the Government construction contractor's debts
to laborers and materialmen has been held entitled to reimbursement out
of amounts due on the contract at the time of the contractor's default
despite the contractor's assignment of contract payments to a bank. 7
The Fifth Circuit has held in favor of the bank where the borrowed
moneys were used in relief of the surety's obligation under the contrac-
tor's bonds.7 4
67. 31 Comp. Gen. 103 (1951).
68. Comptroller General's opinion B-104219, November 7, 1951 to the Travellers' In-
demnity Co.
69. Owens v. American Surety Co., 217 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1954).
70. United States v. Warsaw Elevator Co., 213 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1954).
71. 41 U.S.C.A. § 15.
72. Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 117 Ct. Cl. 736, 93 F. Supp. 891 (1950);
Hardin County Savings Bank v. United States, 106 'Ct. Cl. 577, 65 F. Supp. 1017 (1946);
Modem Industrial Bank v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 808 (1944).
73. First National Bank v. United States, 132 Ct. Cl. 742, 133 F. Supp. 381 (1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 902 (1955). See also Hadden v. United States, 132 Ct. Cl. 529, 132 F. Supp.
202 (1955), vacating 131 Ct. Cl. 326, 130 F. Supp. 401 (1955).
74. General Cas. Co. v. Second Natl Bank, 178 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1950); Cocoanut
Grove Exchange Bank v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 149 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1945).
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On August 25, 1955, the Comptroller General ruled that any excess of
the amount owed by the contractor to the assignee bank could be seized
by the Government to satisfy the contractor's tax indebtedness. This
opinion seeks to distinguish a recent Court of Claims decision.75
An assignment of the proceeds of a contract which contained a no set-
off clause, to a bank pursuant to the Assignment of Claims Act of 1940, at
a time when the contractor was delinquent in its deliveries under the
contract, may not defeat the right of the Government to declare the con-
tractor in default, to purchase the defaulted items from other sources,
or to hold the contractor liable for damages, and, therefore, any
amounts due under the contract were available as a set-off against the
contractor's indebtedness arising out of the default.O°
IX. RECOVERY ON BOND OF SUBCONTRACTOR
A materialman has been held to have a right of action on the bond
of his subcontractor, construed to be conditioned for the payment of labor
and material claims.77 New York is in accord.78 A New Jersey District
Court, following state court decisions, has denied a sub-subcontractor the
right to sue on a subcontractor's performance bond, holding that the
presence of rights under the 'Miller Act precludes a finding that the par-
ties to the subcontractor's bond at the time of its execution intended to
benefit unpaid labor and materialmen.
The surety of a subcontractor is liable on its bond to the general con-
tractor for an unpaid bill for material used in the work under the sub-
75. 35 Comp. Gen. 104 (1955). However, the office of the Comptroller General in
Case No. B-129375, July 9, 1956, decided that the purpose of the loans to the contractor
has no bearing on the assignee's rights. The department which had requeted a ruling on
this point contended that the assignee was required to prove that its advances to the con-
tractor had been used in performing the assigned contract. The Comptroller General ruled
that the legislative history of the 1951 amendment to the Assignment of Claims Act sup-
ports the conclusion that the validity of an assignment is not dependent upon the purpose
for which loans secured by the assignment are made, and that the act nezates any inference
that the no set-off protection is restricted to advances made for performance of the particu-
lar contract containing a "no set-off" clause. In commenting upon the decision reported in
35 Comp. Gen. 1042 (1955), the Comptroller General states in this latest decision that the
earlier case did not involve the question whether loans secured by the assignment were made
to assist the contractor in performing government contracts.
76. 35 Comp. Gen. 149 (1955).
77. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 219 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1955);
Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. E. E. Cloer General Contractor, Inc. 217 F.2d S05
(5th Cir. 1954).
78. Daniel-Mlorris Co. v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co, 303 N.Y. 464, 126 N.E2d 750
(1955), distinguishing McGrath v. American Surety Co., 307 N.Y. 552, 122 N.E2d 906
(1954), wherein the materialman was denied recovery.
79. Frommeyer v. L. & R. Constr. Co, 139 F. Supp. 579 (D.NJ,. 1956).
1956]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
contract, if the subcontract was made with a general contractor doing
work for the United States. 0
A contractor may bring in a subcontractor and subcontractor's surety
as proper parties in a suit by an electrical supplier against the prime
contractor, the subcontractor and their sureties."' Further, he has no
obligation to serve notice on a subcontractor's surety of any default on
the part of the subcontractor (in the absence of any provision in the
bond expressly requiring such notice), prior to the failure of the sub-
contractor to supply needed material.8 2
X. ARBITRATION
Where a federal court has jurisdiction by reason of the diversity of
citizenship of the litigants, and there exists in the state in which the
federal court is located an arbitration statute substantially similar to the
Uniform Arbitration Act, and suit has been instituted on a bond accom-
panying a contract which calls for arbitration, the litigation will be stayed
pending arbitration. 3 The right to arbitration is a right which a federal
court must regard as substantive, and must, therefore, apply the law of
the state in which it sits. 4 An order denying a motion to compel arbi-
tration is an interlocutory decision and is not appealable. It is not within
the purview of the statute to give the Courts of Appeals jurisdiction of
appeals from said interlocutory decisions. 5
XI. BANKRUPTCY
Where the contractor has been adjudicated a bankrupt, a creditor is
not prejudiced in his separate bond action either by refraining from filing
a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceedings, " or by filing a proof of
80. Seaboard Surety Co. v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 277 N.Y. 429, 14 N.E.2d 778 (1938);
Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 151 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
81. Glen Falls Indemnity Co. v. United States ex rel. Westinghouse Co., 229 F.2d 370
(9th Cir. 1955). See also Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Browning-Ferris Machinery Co., 227 F.2d
804 (5th Cir. 1955); United States to Use and for Benefit of Wheeler Corp. v. American
Surety Co. of New York, 142 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1944).
82. Glens Falls Indemnity Co. v. Basich Bros. Constr. Co., 165 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1948).
83. Agostini Bros. Building Corp. v. United States, 142 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1944); Ster-
ling Foundations, Inc. v. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp., 134 F. Supp. 327 (E.D.N.Y.
1955); McElwee-Courbis Constr. Co. v. Rife, 133 F. Supp. 790 (M.D. Pa. 1955).
84. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956), reversing 218 F.2d 948 (2d Cir.
1955), which had reversed 122 F. Supp. 733 (D. Vt. 1954).
85. Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176 (1955); Turkish State Rail-
ways Admin. v. Vulcan Iron Works, 230 F.2d 108 (3d 'Cir. 1956), affirming 136 F. Supp.
622 (M.D. Pa. 1955).




claim in the bankruptcy proceedings . 7 The creditor with bond rights is
not compelled to wait for the termination of the bankruptcy proceedings
to ascertain the amount of dividend, if any. He is entitled to recover
from the surety immediately the amount due on his claim, and the cor-
porate surety, as this creditor's assignee, looks to the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings for salvage.' Any other view of the law would, in effect, be in
derogation of the established legal principle that suit may be instituted
against a surety on a joint and several bond without joining the prin-
cipal.s9
Where the surety has deposited the full penal sum of its bond in court,
but this is insufficient to pay suppliers of labor and material in full, the
surety may not compete with these unpaid materialmen for such portion
of the construction fund as is required to effectuate payment in full?0
XII. CONCLUSION
In the two decades which have passed since the enactment of the
Miller Act, it has become more and more apparent that the separation
of the rights and obligations of the owner and contractor from that of
third party beneficiaries, by the device of executing two separate and
distinct surety bonds, is sound and wise. Every state of the Union, as well
as the federal government, now requires contractors on certain public
works to furnish a bond for the protection of labor and materialmen.
Three states, Kentucky, Maine, and South Carolina, however, lack ex-
press surety bond legislation, but as a matter of policy a bond protecting
labor and materialmen is required by the State Highway Department in
each of these three states. There is nothing ultra vires or contrary to the
public policy in this requirement. It is the right, as well as the interest
of the public body, to secure good work upon its contracts for public
improvements, and there is no better policy toward that end than to
satisfy owners, their competent workmen, and subcontractors and ma-
terialmen, that they can rely on being paid. The requirement of such a
bond attracts a superior grade of subcontractors and materialmen to
public work?'
Among the states which have followed Pennsylvania and the Federal
87. United States for Use of John Davis Co. v. Illinois Surety Co., 226 Fed. 653 (7th
Cir. 1915).
SS. United States Fidelity &'Guaranty Co. v. Eichel, 241 Fed. 357 (3d Cir.), affmed,
without commenting specifically on this point, 245 US. 102 (1917).
89. United States to Use of Goodenow v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 5 F2d 412 (6th
Cir. 1925); Richmond Cedar Works v. Buckner, ISI Fed. 424 (C.CS.D.N.Y. 1910).
90. American Surety Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Mlfg. Co., 296 US. 133, affirming 75
F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1935).
91. Philadelphia v. Stewart, 201 Pa. 526, 51 At. 34S (1902); Philadelphia v. Stevart, 19S
Pa. 309, 45 At. 1056 (1900). See tabulation of bond advantages, pp. 253-54 supra.
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Government by adopting the two-bond system are: Alabama,0 2 Cali-
fornia,93 Connecticut, 4 Vermont,95 and Wisconsin. 0  Georgia adopted
such a two-bond system effective April 1, 1956 with respect to contracts
awarded subsequent to that date. 7
The enactment of the two-bond system has resulted in most instances
in the prompt payment of legitimate claims for labor and material and
is now regarded favorably not only by the suppliers of material and sub-
contractors, but also by bonding company executives who joined in spon-
soring a broad form of coverage and simplified procedure acceptable to
the American Institute of Architects as its Form 107, intended for pri-
vate work. Year after year, interested groups advocate the enactment of
the two-bond system in the several states. The greater the uniformity of
coverage and simplicity of procedure, the more the legislation is in the
public interest.
92. Ala. Code § 2931 (9) (Supp. 1936).
93. Cal. Gen. Laws act 6425, §§ 12-13 (Supp. 1933).
94. Conn. Rev. Stat. fit. 58, c. 362, § 7214 (1949).
95. Vt. Rev. Stat. fit. 20, c. 233, § 4909 (1947).
96. Wis. Stat. c. 289, § 289.16 (1953).
97. Amending Ga. Code c. 23-17, § 23-1705 (1933).
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